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1 Introduction 
On 1 January 1993, the common state of Czechs and Slovaks ceased to exist. The 
separation of Czech and Slovak state happened swiftly and non-violently. This peaceful 
manner in which the dissolution was completed is the reason why it became known as the 
Velvet divorce. The “divorce” took place in the midst of turbulent times after the fall of 
communism followed by a radical change of the political map of Eurasia. The split was 
agreed by Czech and Slovak prime ministers, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar in the 
aftermath of the elections in 1992. There wasn’t a popular majority supporting 
independence in neither country. Explaining dissolution of a state is a complex endeavor, 
one that asks for a thorough analysis of processes, actors, and mechanisms that lead a state 
towards extinction. The Czechoslovakian state was created from the ashes of the World 
War I in 1918 and officially collapsed in January 1993 after peaceful dissolution and in 
many ways intriguing turn of events. The last decade of  20th century was marked by violent 
conflict from the dissolution of Soviet Union to bloody conflicts following the Yugoslavian 
split. However, it was also a time marked by peaceful transition and separation of Czechs 
and Slovaks. The case of Czechoslovakian split gained much interest from academia and 
political analytics who were very intrigued precisely by the peaceful nature of the breakup, 
especially in contrast to the events unfolding in former Yugoslavia at the time. This gave 
traction to the question whether the dissolution was, in fact, inevitable or could have 
Czechs and Slovaks reconciled their differences and under which circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the common state collapsed in 1993 and two newly independent nations 
emerged. 
This Thesis aims to find the reasons behind the anomaly that peaceful dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia represents, and tries to explain the events leading to the Velvet divorce 
as well as the factors that caused it. In the theoretical part of my Thesis, I will try to locate 
the crucial events that led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. 
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 As for the theoretical framework, I will try to apply the securitization theory, which 
I believe will help me grasp the particular mechanics of the non-violent split. I believe that 
this theoretical approach combines a focus on power and strategy on the on hand, but as 
well the focus on identity politics, group realignment and structural change on the other. I 
believe that this kind of approach is needed to analyze and explain the process as complex 
as a dissolution of a state.  
In order to apply the theory to the case of Czechoslovakia, I will try to identify the 
causes of the deteriorating climate, the calculated steps taken to capitalize on these 
developments, as well as the relationship between the two. Analyzing social aspect of the 
breakup and the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks will be an important factor in 
this regard. Post-communist misconceptions and misunderstandings between the two 
nations presented a convenient platform for manipulation and further division of 
Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, what was the role of ethnicity in Czechoslovakia and how 
was national identity manipulated as a driver for disintegration is another important aspect 
that I will focus on. The rise of post-communist nationalist ideologies represented a 
powerful tool for division of Czech and Slovak element in the state and had a considerate 
negative impact regarding national cohesion. Questioning how these nationalist forces 
gained immense political influence and what is the connection between the two is crucial 
for helping understand some factors that caused the split. Thus, the revival of nationalist 
sentiments and its impact on the existence of the Czechoslovak state cannot be ignored.  I 
will focus on the concepts such as securitization, sector approach to security and identity. 
I will try to analyze the events that preceded the dissolution of Czechoslovakia based on a 
wider understanding of identity and identity realignment as political processes as well as 
the wider understanding of security. In the last part of my Thesis, I will evaluate the results 
of applying the theory to this particular case. I am going to work with different type of 
sources on this subject and the research will be based on chronicles relevant for this period 
in time, as well as other relevant publications.  
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The key research question framing my Thesis will be: “What are the key factors 
underlying the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia?” In order to be able to provide a 
sufficiently complex answer, I will have to deal with a set of secondary research questions, 
asking about practices and discourses of members of the political elite who negotiated the 
dissolution, their particular interests, structural economic factors underlying the process, 
as well as the mechanics of the negotiation.  
Therefore, I will try to single out the most important actors and crucial breakpoints 
which contributed to a structural change and dissolution of the state. As far as main actors 
are concerned, political elites played a significant role in the breakup and I will try to assess 
their contribution as well as motives that finally led the state towards dissolution. Indeed, 
elite behavior will be one of the crucial components of the research as I will try to assess 
to what extent did actions or inactions of members of Slovak, Czech, and federal 
governments, as well as the leading members of major political parties, lead Czechoslovak 
state towards the breakup. The main focus will be directed towards main protagonists of 
the split, then Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus and his Slovak counterpart Vladimír 
Mečiar. Questioning the motivation that drove these two men to take action that would 
eventually lead to dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state, as well as questioning their 
motives, whether they were strictly economical or were they motivated by questions of 
ethnicity and identity, will be crucial for understanding the issue. In this regard, I will focus 
on the post-communist economic transformation as well as economic inequality between 
the two nations as another important factor that potentially led the common Czech and 
Slovak state to the point of breakup.  
Furthermore, I will question whether economic inequality de facto existed or was it 
promoted as an actual source of conflict by agents of disintegration. How different Czech 
and Slovak economies actually were after the change of the regime and in what measure 
did the perceived difference affect the collapse of the common state are questions at the 
core of the issue.  
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2 Explaining Czechoslovakia’s Dissolution 
 
2.1 The Role of Political Elites and Institutional Challenges 
 
When trying to dissect the issue of state dissolution, it is prudent to analyze the role 
of the most influential actors in the state, its political elites. After the fall of communism 
in Czechoslovakia following the Velvet revolution, the establishment of new political 
actors began. It is important to note that Czechoslovakia, since its inception, never had a 
single multinational leadership nor autonomous ethnically divided elites. The configuration 
included tripartite elite groups which always included both Czech and Slovak element. 
Nevertheless, the Slovak element wasn’t homogenous as one part of Slovak leadership 
cooperated with Czechs in governance and the other part was formed by the Slovak 
nationalists, who presented a very different perspective on Slovak political agenda (Leff 
2000: 52). Therefore, even though there wasn’t an official Slovak alternative in the 
leadership, there was a clear split among the ranks which made a legitimate problem 
regarding the quarrel over which of these groups represented real Slovak interests.  
Thus, even though Slovaks had legitimate participation and enduring voice in the 
governance, many of them felt that the official leadership failed to represent their interests 
(Leff 2000: 53). As a result, the trilateral form of elite relation presented a considerable 
barrier to managing the issue of state organization as well as the effective functioning of 
the state. It was obvious that this tripartite consensus would not last and its breakdown after 
the end of Soviet occupation was predictable. The political system in place had much to do 
with the viability of the triadic structure of political elites as communist grip proved to be 
crucial in keeping the structure from breakdown. Nevertheless, according to Leff, post-
communist democratization and federalization proved to be critical factors that led towards 
the end of the triadic pattern (Leff 2000: 62). The mentioned triadic pattern represented a 
legitimization for the Czech-Slovak relationship until its demise as it had a historical 
continuity and presented an excuse to avoid the more important issue of change in the 
distribution of state power between the sides (Leff 2000: 61).  
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The breakdown of the triadic pattern meant an institutional crisis which will haunt 
the Czech-Slovak relations till the final breakup of the state. In this regard, the experience 
of the short-lived Second Republic which existed from 1945 to 1948 provides some 
explanations for the latter development of parallel party systems in the Czech and Slovak 
republics. During this time, occurred the separation of the Czech and Slovak electoral 
politics which could be seen as a consequence of increased Slovak national awareness. The 
democratization of both political systems proved to be an opportunity for a split along 
republican lines and emergence of two separate party subsystems. Here it is important to 
note that during the Communist reign despite the existence of Slovak communist party, the 
regime was able to bridge the national divide by forcing the national agenda to both sides 
(Shepherd 2000: 133). Thus, in line with Leff’s argument: “Emerging democratized 
Czechoslovak state which gave voices to the leaderships of sub-state republican 
governments did not survive the new realities of a more liberal political order and 
competitive elections” (Leff 2000: 61–62). 
 
According to some authors, the crucial component needed for the success of 
federalism in Czechoslovakia was consensual and concerted effort to sustain it both by the 
Czech and Slovak political elites. In order to understand the lack of this effort on both 
sides, one must take into account the conditions under which elites operated. According to 
Petr Kopecký, these conditions did not motivate either side to compromise but on contrary 
gave them no reason to. The volatile pattern of elite-mass linkages is one important aspect 
of the issue. The author further argues: “During the post-communist period of 
democratization, very few voters had pre-existing party and social loyalties. Therefore, the 
emergence of the open electoral market encouraged an atmosphere of intense competitive 
behavior among members of the political elite. What this provided was a substantial 
motivation for avoiding the compromise and competing for the biggest share of the 
electorate while potentially destabilizing the process of democratic politics” (Kopecký 
2000: 121).  
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What this further meant was that the increased competition not only increased the 
stakes of early elections but also made space for opportunism of party behavior. The issues 
that were open to political exploitation and gained much traction were above institutional 
squabbling and ethnical division as this was a viable way for elites to gain distinctive 
political profile. In Kopecky’s words: “Fierce competition among the elites was, therefore, 
to be expected, as they did compete not only for the available voters but also for favorable 
rules of the game under the emerging institutional system” (Kopecký 2000: 122).    
Considering that in Czechoslovakia there was less possibility to exploit religious or 
class dimension of society, the obvious choice for manipulation was the ethnicity card 
which proved to be a very effective weapon in the hands of political elites. This trend was 
especially noticed in Slovakia where ethnicity and the Czech-Slovak relations became an 
occurring theme of many parties’ political agenda. This nationalist shift in Slovak political 
space became more and more prominent creating more room for conflict with their Czech 
counterparts (Kopecký 2000: 121). The newly formed Slovak party, Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia led by Vladimír Mečiar, emerged on Slovak political scene after the 
split of Public Against Violence party (VPN) in 1991. The emergence of a new party which 
would represent Slovak national interests dramatically changed Slovak political spectrum. 
Motivated by the success of Vladimír Mečiar and his new party, the other parties in Slovak 
political arena adopted similar Slovak oriented rhetoric. One of those parties was The 
Slovak Christian Democrats led by Ján Čarnogurský, who, according to Kopecký, made a 
move that took many of the members of the Czech political elite off guard (Kopecký 2000: 
122). Čarnogurský presented an alternative perspective of Slovak future, constructing the 
vision of independent Slovakia within Europe. KDH’s platform for future constitutional 
forms was expressed by their slogan “For a little seat and a little star in the European 
Union” (Čarnogurský 2000: 355).  
Another example of change in Slovak party politics was The Party of Democratic 
Left, formed from the former communist core, which broke with its Czech counterpart 
because it showed support for the national politics of Vladimír Mečiar.  
12 
 
Therefore, it was obvious that change in the rhetoric of one part of the political elites 
presented a challenge to the stability of the whole system. Thus, Kopecký argues that the 
relationship between the Czech and Slovak political leaders was starting to be increasingly 
divisive and focused on their own ethnonational political agendas (Kopecký 2000: 122-
123).  
In many ways, the breakup of Czechoslovakia differed from the dissolution of other 
former Communist states especially when it comes to the character of the process that 
generated the split. One of the most evident and significant differences was the degree of 
implication of Czechoslovakia's political elites and its' exclusive power to make decisions 
about the future of the state. As mentioned, what was evident was that ethnic divides were 
getting more space in the political arena and that political elite was very successful in 
mobilizing citizens on the basis of ethnic affiliation. Slavomír Ravik argues that the future 
of the common state was decided long before the final count of electoral votes. According 
to Ravik, the public surveys and popularity of certain candidates were enough evidence to 
understand that the future of the state will be negotiated between the two dominant figures 
of the political arena. The figures in question were Slovak and Czech prime ministers, 
Vladimír Mečiar and Václav Klaus who, according to Ravik, were not the type of men who 
would go out of their way to seek compromise (Ravik 2006: 204). The author mentions 
another important political figure at the time, the former president of the Czechoslovak 
federation and former dissident Václav Havel. The author claims that Havel along with the 
other two members of the Czech and Slovak political elite formed a triangle that would 
decide the future of the state. According to an illustrative metaphor by Ravik, the trio 
formed a sort of “Bermuda triangle” as far as the common future of the state was concerned 
(Ravik 2006: 163).  
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2.2 Slovak Nationalism 
 
Before addressing the central issues which explain the mechanics of the split, it is 
necessary to take a very brief look at some of the evidence of the rising Slovak national 
consciousness. According to Robin Shepherd, contrary to the impression given in some 
writing and most talk at the time, calls for independence did not arise out of a vacuum. 
When exactly a national consciousness acquires the critical mass required to produce 
statehood is difficult to assess. The author claims that: “What is absolutely clear about the 
1993 separation is that Czechoslovak national consciousness had been edging into a state 
of meltdown ever since the end of communism in 1989” (Shepherd 2000: 133). However, 
according to Leff this national sentiment emerged from the existence of the wartime Slovak 
state which gave a significant institutional foundation to the Slovak nationalist aspirations. 
Thus, this Slovak experience may have led to the issue of bipolarity of Czech and Slovak 
party systems in the post-communist years (Leff 2000: 62).  
Regarding the issue of Czechoslovak dissolution, Václav Havel wrote in the 
foreword of the book “Irreconcilable Differences” that the citizens of Czechoslovakia have 
always identified with Czechoslovak statehood and felt that Czechoslovakia was their 
natural home. Havel continues to say that the very idea of its division was a harsh assault 
on our sense of identity. That is why, he claims, many expended considerable effort in the 
attempt to rebuild the existing formal federation in a genuine and democratic federation in 
which all would feel at home. However, this effort was unsuccessful he admits. Former 
Czechoslovak president concludes by saying: “With the passage of time, historians will 
judge whether it was unsuccessful because it lacked a clear vision, because it was 
inconsistent or somehow flawed in its very points of departure, or because face to face with 
Slovak aspirations, it quite simply could not have been successful” (Kraus 2000: 6). The 
former Czechoslovak president mentions a harsh assault on our sense of identity meaning 
an assault on the idea of common Czechoslovak identity.  However, the last point Havel 
makes, where he blames so-called Slovak “aspirations” for dissolution of the common state 
is perhaps most revealing.  
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Therefore, the question regarding what kind of effect Slovak nationalist aspirations 
had on the common sense of identity is at the core of the issue. As Wolchik notes, in the 
post-1989 political climate, leaders as Mečiar, who, according to the author was the main 
figure in negotiating dissolution along with Klaus, derived part of his support from voters 
who supported him because he was more successful in articulating Slovak grievances than 
other politicians. Wolchik explains that there were few institutional mechanisms that 
encouraged contact between Czechs and Slovaks on a regular basis or in a way that could 
influence political developments. Furthermore, considering that electoral system was 
organized along republic lines, the lack of such mechanisms meant that it was much easier 
for political leaders to mobilize voters along ethnic lines and around ethnic grievances. 
Similarly, considering the limited powers of the republic governments, the federal 
government became one of the main issues of contention as the perceived defects of the 
federation became one of the most important sources of Slovak dissatisfaction. Finally, 
Wolchik claims that Slovakia’s disadvantaged position within the Czechoslovak federation 
inflamed popular support for nationalist movements and politicians in Slovakia in the post-
communist years (Wolchik 2000: 151). 
 
It is important to mention that, even though the ethnically oriented agenda was very 
successful at the time, many of the Czechoslovak citizens continued to be against the 
breakup of the state. Nevertheless, as Wolchik notes: “As in other contexts, elite 
articulations of ethnic aims were also conditioned by mass responses” (Wolchik 2000: 
141). Furthermore, many Slovak voters voted for members of the political elite who 
propagated some form of Slovak independence, whether as a new state or with a changed 
position within Czechoslovakia. In addition, Wolchik argues that given Slovakia's history 
which saw the organization of most political parties along ethnic lines during the pre-
communist times, it was to no surprise that the revitalized political parties formed within 
rather than across ethnic lines (Wolchik 2000: 151).  
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Therefore, the rise of support for the two most vocal political parties that advocated 
national interests, Slovak National Party and Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for Democratic 
Slovakia, demonstrated the power of nationalism as an effective political tool.  
 
 In his book “Czechoslovakia: The Velvet revolution and beyond” Robin Shepherd 
looks for the sources of the above-mentioned Slovak nationalism. In the book Shepherd 
claims: “When nationalist parties in Slovakia looked for the proof that Slovakia can 
manage itself and its own affairs without the help of Czechs, they found it in a very 
troubling place” (Shepherd 2000: 128). The source of their inspiration was the Slovak 
wartime state under the regime of Jozef Tiso. Shepherd takes the reader back to the 
aftermath of Tiso’s Berlin meeting with Hitler in 1939 where he gave his address to the 
Slovak Provincial Assembly. At this time, the motion concerning the future of Slovakia 
was proposed and accepted. The motion represented the end of Czechoslovakia and 
emergence of independent Slovak state for the first time in history. Therefore, the author 
argues: “It is not hard to understand why nationalists looked for inspiration in the wartime 
Slovak state. Independence, regardless of the circumstances it was achieved in, represented 
a big source of national pride for a certain part of the Slovak nation. It is true that many 
Slovaks were against this state entity and did not agree with the regime, however, the 
country was safe and it provided a fertile ground for voicing national aspirations” 
(Shepherd 2000: 128). The most important aspect was the fact that Slovaks, under 
complicated circumstances, showed they were capable of governing their own country 
(Shepherd 2000: 128). Wolchik weighs in on the issue as well and claims that the creation 
of the separate Slovak state in 1939 is one of the most controversial issues in Slovak 
history. Furthermore: “For many Slovaks the creation of an independent Slovak state 
represented the fulfillment of their national aspirations despite the way in which it was 
created” (Wolchik 2000: 148). Thus, whatever the conditions under which it was formed, 
experience of having their own state contributed to Slovak state building process according 
to Wolchik (Wolchik 2000: 148).  
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Regarding the Slovak wartime state, Shepherd further notes that on the one hand 
Slovak government was formed successfully, the economy was on the rise, universities had 
expanded and cultural life had benefited generally. On the other hand, there was the 
troubling aspect of Slovakia being a vassal state of the Third Reich, which meant 
systematic anti-Semitism as well as collaborating with Nazi regime in their war effort. As 
the author notes: “History books had to be rewritten" (Shepherd 2000: 128).  
In an interesting example of how the regime change affected the writing of history 
books in Slovakia was a book by Milan S. Durica, a professor of Central and Eastern 
European history at the University of Padua in Italy. After the book was written it became 
a handbook for all Slovak primary schools on instruction from the Ministry of Education. 
The book contained many controversial statements regarding the wartime Slovak state and 
it was criticized for being historically incorrect as well as too lenient on the wartime Slovak 
regime. Slovak Academy of Sciences, in a letter sent to the Education Minister, pointed 
out that more than a quarter of Durica's work had been devoted to the six years of Tiso’s 
rule. This was troubling because it contained almost as much text as the part on 
developments in the nearly nineteen centuries up to 1848. The authors provided a vast 
number of Durica’s historical errors and misinterpretations. The most important points 
address Durica's treatment of the ruthless persecution of Slovak Jews under the Tiso’s 
regime and the deportation of tens of thousands of them to Nazi death camps. The 
controversial book was intended to be a handbook for teachers of 10-year-old children 
(Shepherd 2000: 129).  
This whole affair was even more relevant as it concerned Mečiar's Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). In the midst of the controversy, HZDS released the 
following statement: “The HZDS has been attentively following the campaign, initiated 
with hatred and arrogance, against the university Professor, Milan S. Durica [...] This book 
should become an educational supplement for public school students. In no case can the 
historical truth about Slovakia and the Slovaks be undermined or concealed. The HZDS 
has the deepest respect for everything that professor Durica has done for Slovakia and its 
well-being and for making Slovakia more visible abroad” (Shepherd 2000: 129).  
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The controversial book was eventually withdrawn but the most troubling aspect was 
the support it received from the ruling Slovak party. This incident showed the trend of 
drawing inspiration from a fascist dictatorship which, according to Shepherd, fueled the 
expression of Slovak nationalism in a democratic environment. To conclude, Shephard 
notes that: “Right from the outset, the nationalist consciousness was tainted by what it 
obviously perceived as a need to distort and deceive” (Shepherd 2000: 129). This leads the 
author to point out that it seems plausible to suggest that some of the aberrations of the 
Mečiar years could be traced back to this initial flaw (Shepherd 2000: 129). 
 
However, it would not be helpful for the aim of this Thesis to give too much credit 
for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia to the rise of Slovak nationalism, as the breakup of 
Czechoslovakia wasn’t solely a product of actions and decisions made by the Slovak 
citizens. The year 1991 brought a big change in both Czech and Slovak political arenas. 
On 24 February 1991, Civic Forum split into Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Václav 
Klaus and Center-Left Civic Movement (OH) led by Jiří Dienstbier. On the Slovak side, 
Mečiar broke with his former party VPN and created the already mentioned, new political 
platform Movement for Democratic Slovakia. These two splits in major Slovak and Czech 
political parties had enormous implications for the future breakup of the common state. 
The split gave rise to two leading actors in both Czech and Slovak political space and their 
mutual interaction represented a beginning of the end of the Czechoslovak federation. The 
important moment in this regard and arguably the turning point in the balance of political 
power came when Mečiar’s HZDS officially adopted the notion of Slovak svrchovanost 
(Rychlík 2000: 90).  
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2.3 Breaking Points – 1992 elections and Declaration of Slovak 
“svrchovanost” 
 
An important moment, which contributed to the change of balance in regards to 
political power in Slovakia was split in the ranks of Slovak Christian Democrats. Similar 
to the VPN breakup, group which advocated nationalist-oriented agenda led by Jan Klepač 
split from the KDH. The new political grouping asked for a change of institutional 
organization and advocated the establishment of a confederation knowing that Czech side 
was adamantly against such arrangement deeming the proposal unacceptable. On 4 
November 1991 Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Slovak National Party and Klepač 
led platform submitted a proposal for declaration of Slovak sovereignty to the Slovak 
National Council, the proposal was made public on 12 September 1991. However, this 
doesn't indicate the support of Slovak population for the breakup nor confederation model. 
It is important to note that after the emergence of the proposal for Slovak sovereignty, 
another petition was created in reaction to it, the one which supported the existence of the 
common state and received almost equal support (Rychlík 2000: 91). Therefore, the 
division was obvious not only among the Czechoslovak population but individually 
between Czechs and Slovaks as well. The direct consequence of this situation was that 
Čarnogurský was forced to find a compromise with the Czechs and the parties involved 
were the Civic Movement on the Czech side and KDH with VPN on the Slovak side. The 
Czech government led by Petr Pithart was willing to accept a treaty between the Czech and 
Slovak republics which was supposed to precede the federal constitution. On 3 November 
1991, the top representatives of all three governments and parliaments gathered informally 
at the private villa of President Václav Havel in Hrádeček near Trutnov where they were 
supposed to reach a compromise with the goal of overcoming the institutional crisis 
(Rychlík 2000: 91).  
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The outcome of the gathering was predominantly positive and an agreement was 
reached to form a binding Czech-Slovak treaty. Nevertheless, solution regarding legal 
incorporation of the treaty into the national and federal constitutions remained unsettled. 
Furthermore, another unsolved issue was how to make the treaty binding so that future 
constitutions would not be able to abolish it. The compromise was not reached until January 
1992 when members of both Czech and Slovak National Councils met in Prague and 
decided that the treaty would be signed by both republics which will be represented by 
their National Councils. According to Rychlík, significant effort was invested in the 
creation of a draft treaty, with a special focus on treaty language in order for it to be 
acceptable for both sides (Rychlík 2000: 92). 
On the one hand, KDH compromised and gave up its demand that the treaty had to 
be signed by both republics as it would legally form an international treaty between two 
independent states. On the other hand, Slovak side was pleased as the treaty specified the 
framework of the future federal constitution which was in accordance with their demands 
(Kraus 2000: 92). However, the proposal was finally defeated as it didn’t pass the voting 
of the presidium of Slovak National Council.  Ten members of the presidium voted for the 
proposal, and equal number voted against preventing it from being submitted to the Slovak 
National Council as a whole. In reaction to the results from Slovakia, the Czech National 
Council deemed any further negotiation with the Slovak side pointless. In Slovakian 
political space, failed proposal meant definitive split within the KDH. The grouping led by 
Klepač officially broke from the party and formed a new party the Slovak Christian 
Democratic Movement (SKDH). The future of Czechoslovak relations was left to the 
victors of next elections (Rychlík 2000: 93).  
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One of the crucial moments regarding the future of the common Czechoslovak state 
came in June 1992 when new elections to Federal Assembly and National Councils took 
place. The coalition between ODS led by Václav Klaus and Christian Democratic Party 
(KDS) won in the Czech Republic with a clear agenda of accomplishing economic reform 
as well as moving the country towards democratic and capitalist society. As far as the 
constitutional framework was concerned the coalition put forward the slogan: “Either a 
functioning federation or the division of Czechoslovakia into two states” (Rychlík 2000: 
93). Meanwhile, in Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar’s HZDS won on the basis of populist 
sometimes even contradictory statements about the future of the common state. His take 
on constitutional framework was a confusing mix of demands for sovereignty, international 
recognition for Slovakia as well as maintenance of the common state (Rychlík 2000: 93).  
Therefore, Mečiar walked the line between sovereignty and federation while trying 
to present both options as if they were not mutually exclusive. This strategy proved to be 
very efficient for Mečiar as it helped him win a substantial number of votes from voters 
who actually supported the common state, especially those with lower education (Rychlík 
2000: 94). It is important to note that leadership of the party didn't seem to be concerned 
with any possible objections coming from the Czech side when presenting their variants of 
constitutional arrangements. This was true despite the Czech side being adamant and 
claiming that it would not accept any other form other than a federation. In addition, Civic 
Movement was defeated in the Czech Republic which demonstrated a significant shift in 
the Czech political arena as well as an unpredictable future for the common state. The 
backbone of pro-federal Czech political wing failed to win seats in either the Federal 
Assembly or the Czech National Council (Rychlík 2000: 94). 
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The other possible breaking point was proclamation of Slovak “svrchovanost” on 
17 July 1992: “In this historical moment, we declare the right of Slovak nation to self-
determination, as it is embedded in all international conventions and treaties on the right 
of nations to self-determination. Recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, we 
declare, that we as well want to freely establish the manner of national and happy life, 
where we will respect the rights of all, every citizen, nations, national and ethnic minorities, 
democratic and humanistic legacies of Europe and the world. With this declaration, Slovak 
National Council declares svrchovanost of Slovak republic as a foundation of Slovak 
sovereign state” (Rychlik 2012: 313). According to Rychlík, the term “svrchovanost” is a 
translation of the term sovereignty, thus the terms have identical meaning. What it entails 
is that the state holds the right to decide about all issues which are or could be subjects of 
international law. The sovereign state, therefore, has the right to act by itself internationally 
and enter into treaties with other states but also guarantees to fulfill the treaty obligations 
by itself. Therefore, genuine “svrchovanost” is possible only as an attribute of independent 
states (Rychlík 2012: 313).  
 
According to Rychlík, there is a possibility that a de jure independent state is not de 
facto sovereign. This situation occurs when a domestic or foreign policy of the state is 
influenced by another, more powerful state through coercive treaties, for example, mid-
war Slovak state which was subjected to Germany. However, it is not possible that a state 
would be a part of a federation and stay fully sovereign. In that case, part of its sovereignty 
passes to the supranational entities (Rychlík 2012: 201). Thus, this profoundly anti-federal 
position formed by nationalist Slovak parties, including the Slovak National Party in 1991, 
asked for the immediate transfer of all competencies to Slovak organs. This move 
represented a shift in Mečiar’s politics as he was regarded as federalist up to this point 
(Rychlík 2000: 90). 
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2.4 Economy behind the Breakup 
 
Many social scientists find that ethnic conflict is often generated as a consequence 
of increasing regional economic imbalance or applied to the case of Czechoslovakia when 
one republic is discriminated against economically by the federation. Therefore, a very 
important aspect that many authors highlight when discussing the Czechoslovak split, is 
the assumed difference regarding economic growth and strength of both states. Jan Svejnar 
considers this economic heterogeneity of Czech and Slovak republics, only a perceived 
difference which, nonetheless, significantly contributed to the dissolution. The author notes 
that the introverted nature of the Czech-Slovak debates was so myopic that elite leaders 
failed to acknowledge the vast number of similarities between the Czech and Slovak 
economies when compared to other economies in the region (Svejnar 2000: 276). 
  Here it is important to add that in 1918 the First Czechoslovak Republic inherited 
over 60 percent of the entire industrial production of the Austro-Hungarian empire and that 
Slovakia representing only 21 percent of the Czechoslovak population, accounted for 
maximum 8,5 percent of common industrial production (Svejnar 2000:277). However, the 
communist regime’s effort to invest in Slovakia’s industry and significantly increase 
country’s economic development resulted in a considerable reduction of the historically 
large Czecho-Slovak economic disparity. According to the analysis by Josef Kotrba and 
Karel Kříž, the relative per capita income differential between the two republics was 47 
percent in 1953 but this considerable gap narrowed to mere 9 percent in 1990 (Svejnar 
2000: 279). Further study showed that in 1989 the relative distribution of labor force across 
principal sectors was very similar. As an illustration, the proportion in agriculture was 11 
percent in the Czech Republic while in Slovakia it was 14 percent. As for the industry, 
Czech Republic accounted for 39 percent of the total and Slovakia for 33 percent (Svejnar 
2000: 279). 
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Therefore, the research results point to somewhat more balanced economic output 
and not very different level of economic growth in both republics during the first post-
Soviet years. This 40 years long Communist investment in Slovakia’s economic 
development seems to be crucial in this regard and one of the defining factors why in 1989 
both republics were very similar from an economic standpoint. Slovakia managed to 
practically close the output and income gap between the two republics in what Svejnar 
calls: “A rare example of successful economic development from a low to a middle-income 
country under economy planning” (Svejnar 2000: 289). The author concludes by claiming 
that, with the exception of unemployment, the economic performance of the Czech and 
Slovak republics has been very similar in the period before, as well as after the partition of 
the common state (Svejnar 2000: 289).   
Slovakia’s experience with high levels of unemployment during 1991 and 1992 (in 
comparison to the Czech lands - the ratio being 3:1) has fueled the arguments that the 
economic ministries in Prague dominated by Czechs are not concerned with serving Slovak 
interests (Kraus–Stanger 2000: 31). On the other side, the Czechs felt that their revenues, 
which were being poured into Slovakia, were not appreciated by the Slovak side. Thus, at 
the time of elite negotiations which decided the future of Czechoslovakia this considerable 
economic similarity of both economies was essentially ignored. The main points of debates 
were focused on differences rather than similarities. Focusing on aspects such as high 
unemployment rate in Slovakia and a bit weaker economic performance of the country, 
enabled the leaders to exploit these differences and present it as unsolvable barriers to the 
further existence of federation (Svejnar 2000: 290). Therefore, the breakup of the state was 
a convenient solution for political elites of both republics as it permitted the Slovak 
leadership to proceed with more moderate and socially oriented policies, and at the same 
time allowed the Czech government to go through with rapid economic transformation. 
The post-1993 economies of both states also indicated how uninterested the political 
leaderships of both republics were in the possibility of common future, as statistics showed 
a very similar pattern of growth according to Svejnar (Svejnar 2000: 290).  
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Here it would be helpful to include Petr Pithart’s following comment about Václav 
Klaus: “I believe that he made his mind long before the elections how to deal with the 
federation and that is to dissolve it. However, only if it wouldn’t be possible to centralize 
it, that is ‘unfederalize’ it. Federation in any form or shape represents only complications 
and burden for economists like Klaus. Division of authority is a burden, regardless of 
conditions of the division” (Ravik 2006: 204). In this sense, this perceived regional 
economic disparity played a part in leading the state towards the breakup. 
Petr Zajac provides further insight on Czech-Slovak dissolution from an economic 
standpoint, when he argues that one of the key obstacles to the resolution of the 
constitutional impasse was the issue of economic transformation. Zajac claims that 
Slovakia had a different character of economic transformation from the beginning because 
of its higher level of unemployment. Furthermore, many Slovaks were suspicious of Klaus' 
reforms and his solutions for economic transformation including liberalization of prices, 
restitution, and privatization. This, according to Zajac, produced a sentiment of nostalgia 
for the old regime in Slovakia.  The author further stresses the different modernization 
experiences both republics had (Zajac 2000: 388-389).  “Communist investment in Slovak 
economy helped Slovaks reach economic development, but contrary to the Czech side, it 
did not foster a rise of democratic political culture. Therefore, Slovakia diverged from the 
general strategy of transformation which was identified with the federation” (Zajac 2000: 
388-389). Robin Shepherd also finds that process of modernization was the essential 
difference between the Czech and Slovak nations. The fact that modernization had taken 
place at different times and under different conditions made all the difference according to 
the author. Modernization refers to the processes of industrialization, urbanization, literacy, 
demography, political pluralism and secularization (Shepherd 2000 133–134). 
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 Hence, according to Svejnar, apart from national issues, the unsatisfying 
constitutional arrangement, impact of political transition, the assumed difference between 
Czech and Slovak economies influenced the willingness of Czech elite leadership to agree 
to a breakup of the federation. Moreover, faced with the issues over the form of the state 
as well as the continuous conflict over the pace and nature of economic reform in the first 
three years after the fall of Soviet regime, Václav Klaus along with his colleagues in the 
Czech leadership, had not only political but also economic reasons to incline towards the 
breakup of the common state (Wolchik 2000: 158). Thus, being faced with accelerated 
rising unemployment as well as somewhat faster rate of decline in the Slovak economy 
when compared to the Czech one, Slovak leadership supported the idea of a steadier 
approach to the transition from plan to market economies. On the other hand, the Czech 
perspective focused on historically less-developed nature of the Slovak economy. This 
made many Czech leaders perceive the Slovak economy as a stumbling block to Czech 
rapidly growing economy (Svejnar 2000: 276). 
 
One important factor which influenced the higher rate of unemployment in Slovakia 
according to Svejnar could be the difference in demand conditions. The author notes that: 
“Nationally, as well as at the level of individual districts, the Czech Republic had more job 
openings than Slovakia. Considering that vacancies signal demand for workers, the Czech 
Republic had more favorable demand conditions” (Svejnar 2000: 288). Furthermore: “The 
more rapid creation of small private firms that tend to engage in labor-intensive production 
as well as the more significant inflow of foreign direct investment are plausible product 
market causes of this labor market phenomenon” (Svejnar 2000: 288). Jan Rychlík further 
notes that nationalist opposition, primarily SNS, used the unsatisfactory economic situation 
for anti-Czech political propaganda. Above all, the ongoing reform was criticized along 
with federal minister of finance and vice prime minister Václav Klaus. Not only in the 
ranks of SNS but also part of VPN and KDH, an idea of specific reform for Slovakia 
emerged. This was an already known idea of independent Slovak market functioning with 
its own regulatory mechanisms (Rychlík 2012: 270-271).  
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Above all, it was Jozef Kučerák, the Slovak vice prime minister who advocated for 
stronger republic control of economies, but he claimed that was not because of political but 
only economic reasons (Rychlík 2012: 270-271). Moreover, Rychlík claims that appeal for 
independent economic reform was very difficult to put in praxis as it meant eliminating 
Czechoslovakia as integrated tax, custom and monetary area. This would effectively end 
any debate about the existence of the common state. Another rift as mentioned was the 
issue of privatization, namely so-called big privatization which consisted of selling shares 
of government firms to citizens. One of the biggest proponents of privatization in the Czech 
Republic, Tomáš Ježek, afraid that part of Czech property would end up in the hands of 
foreigners, started supporting separate privatization in both republics. “I started thinking 
that if privatization would go federal and then the state would fall apart. That would be a 
big mess. It would mean that part of Czech property we gave out for free to foreigners. 
That is why I supported Čarnogursky's idea that we should divide privatization beforehand. 
It wouldn't be a problem. Both processes would run parallelly along national lines and we 
would explain to people that Czechs should invest in the Czech Republic and Slovaks in 
Slovakia” (Rychlik 2012: 273).  
Former HZDS vice president Augustin Marian Huska, a man very close to Mečiar, 
commented on Klaus' economic reform predictions in “Literarny tyždennik” newspapers 
in 1992: “Instead of economic decline of 5 percent as Klaus predicted, by the end of 1991 
economic decline was 12 percent and halfway into this year it will be 20 percent. Instead 
of 30 percent inflation, that Klaus predicted, inflation reached the rate of 70 percent. As for 
the unemployment rate, it is 5 to 15 percent higher than Klaus predicted. In conclusion, 
Klaus either deliberately underestimated recession, inflation, and unemployment, or his 
conception of the invisible hand is ineffective, I assume it is the latter” (Ravik 2006: 241). 
This stance from the Slovak side shows the growing split in opinion regarding the 
economic transformation of the country as well as Slovak dissatisfaction of the federal 
course.   
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According to Robin Shepherd, radical economic shock therapy was an appropriate 
policy platform for a country with the kind of economy the Czechs lived in. In Slovakia, 
the contrary appeared to apply. Economic policies were formed distinctively, applicable to 
different kinds of economies and countries. “There is the idea held by some authors which 
claim that had the programs for transition, especially economic transition been more 
flexible, greater accommodation of the national conflict would, perhaps, have been 
possible. The different national economic priorities in each cannot be disassociated so 
cleanly from other aspects of nationhood” (Shepherd 2000: 142). In conclusion, Shephard 
claims it is important to stress that the discrepancy regarding economic policy was not 
some issue which the nationalist cause simply latched on to as economy is a crucial part of 
what the nation is (Shepherd 2000: 142). 
3 Applying the Theory 
 
3.1 The Copenhagen School 
 
The concept of security was traditionally tied with concepts of strategy and power. 
Especially in the period after the World War II, it often seemed that this is all security is 
about. According to the teachings of strategic studies, the main focus was on the defense 
of the territorial state, military and material power. This kind of thinking made it almost 
impossible to see security through another lens. However, the past several decades have 
presented an immense challenge to this perspective on security and security analysis. The 
concept of state-centrism, rationalist assumptions about agency and action as well as 
limited materialist visions of structure and power have all been challenged and criticized 
by the new emerging schools of thought. Moreover, the focus was now on the inherent and 
deep connection of security thinking and action with politics and power. Thus, the focus 
was on the actors trying to reframe issues and on the political and cultural impact of their 
successes and failures (Williams 2007: 1).   
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In addition, a need for broadening the analytic and methodological agenda of 
security studies, but also simultaneous concern regarding widening its scope and 
introducing concepts of identity, human security, environmental security, and many others 
has given rise to new interpretations of security and new captivating debates in the field. 
At the core of this shift, has been a systematic change that occurred after the end of the 
Cold War and systematic reconceptualization of security relations in the following period. 
The part of academia advocating for a more constructivist approach to analysis was most 
vocal in arguing that the change which post-Cold War period generated showed the 
inadequacy of narrow rationalist and materialist understandings of state action and a 
growing need for more sociologically complex theories of security. The theory would focus 
on concepts such as culture and identity and analysts would place these concepts at the 
center of their inquiry (Williams 2007: 1). Consequently, a number of new theories 
concerned with different, more complex approaches to security have emerged and taken 
place in contemporary security studies. One of those most prominent voices of this new 
vibrating field were the voices of the Copenhagen school led by Barry Buzan and Ole 
Weaver as its most prominent representatives. 
 
In terms of the most applicable theory regarding the dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
and achieving the primary goal of this Thesis, the most helpful contribution of the 
Copenhagen School has been the concept of “securitization”. Security is, according to 
Copenhagen School, a speech act and by saying “security” a state representative declares 
an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block 
a threatening development. (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 21). “The Securitization 
Theory focuses on the intersubjective process through which ‘threats’ manifest themselves 
as security problems on the political agenda. Threats in that sense are ‘objective’ when they 
are accepted by significant political actors, not because they have an inherent threatening 
status. Security is, in short, a self-referential practice” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 
24). 
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The Copenhagen School categorizes various security threats according to sectors, 
which include: military, political, economic, social, and environmental (Buzan – Wæver – 
de Wilde 1998: 22). “In the political sector, existential threats are traditionally defined in 
terms of constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state. 
Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, 
legitimacy, or governing authority. In the societal sector referent object is large-scale 
collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions. 
Given the peculiar nature of this type of referent object, it is extremely difficult to establish 
hard boundaries that differentiate existential from lesser threats. Buzan adds that: 
“Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external 
developments” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 23). However, it is important to stress 
that security cannot be projected on everything.  “Primarily, due to the fact that not all 
political issues can be prioritized and given security importance simultaneously, and 
because the creation of a discourse of security threats will be determined by various factors 
such as state’s history, or geographical and structural position. Last but not the least, 
because it provokes reactions from other actors, internationally as well as domestically” 
(Buzan –  Hansen 2009: 34).  Furthermore, Buzan asserts: “If security speech acts are to 
be successful, they also need to convince their relevant audiences” (Buzan –  Hansen 2009: 
34).  
 “Securitization refers more precisely to the process of presenting an issue in 
security terms, in other words as an existential threat: The way to study securitization is to 
study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular 
rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate 
violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? If by means of an argument 
about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed 
to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are 
witnessing a case of securitization” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 25). 
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Thus, the Copenhagen School claims that securitization is the move that takes 
politics beyond established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind 
of politics or as above politics. Securitization can therefore, be seen as a more extreme 
version of politicization meaning that the issue is presented as an existential threat requiring 
emergence measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 23–24). 
 
Securitizing actors are defined as: “Actors who securitize issues by declaring 
something – a referent object – existentially threatened”, referent objects as: “Things that 
are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan 
– Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 36). Here it is important to add that according to Buzan: “While 
securitization theory was in principle open for anyone to make the ‘securitizing move’, in 
practice the most common securitizing actors are political leaders, bureaucracies, 
governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups, and referent objects usually middle-range 
collectivities” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 40–41).  
 
Therefore, issues become securitized when leaders (whether political, societal, or 
intellectual) begin to talk about them and gain an ear of the public and the state in terms of 
existential threats against some valued referent object. Buzan gives more insight on what 
can be labeled as a securitizing move when he claims that there is a certain ambiguity in 
securitization theory because: “The utterance of the word security is not the decisive 
criterion and securitization might consist of only a metaphorical security reference” (Buzan 
– Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 27). Furthermore, the author asserts that constituting something 
as a security problem might be a problematic or even dangerous strategy because it grants 
privilege to official leaders and legitimizes the suspension of civil and liberal rights (Buzan 
– Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 27).  
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However, a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential 
threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing 
move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such. In other 
words: “The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a 
platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other 
steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential 
threats, point of no return, and necessity” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 25).  
 
Societal security was defined as: “The ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Wæver a kol. 1993: 
23). While the state was the referent object for political, military, environmental and 
economic security, it was society that constituted the referent object for societal security 
(Wæver a kol. 1993: 26). This opened up opportunities for the study of “identity security” 
and pointed to cases where state and societies did not align, for instance when national 
minorities were threatened by their state, or where the state, or other political actors, 
mobilized society to confront internal or external threats (Buzan – Hansen 2009: 213).  
In more detail, societal security according to Copenhagen school concerns: “The 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of 
language, culture and religious and national identity and custom” (McSweeney 2004: 59). 
The indicators of strength and weakness of a state are summed up in the concept of “socio-
political cohesion” which is labeled as the essence of statehood. Another important aspect 
of the theory is concerned with economic threats to particular groups within a society, 
which can affect the security of society as a whole. According to Copenhagen school’s one 
of the most prominent critics Bill McSweeney: “This observation is made analytically true, 
if one accepts the definition of society in terms of ‘individuals identifying themselves as 
members of a community’.” (McSweeney 2004: 72). Furthermore, the author claims that 
the crucial and sole value, which the Copenhagen school conceives as vulnerable in the 
event of economic threats is the societal identity (McSweeney 2004: 72).  
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Wæver argues that: “Security problem is something that can undercut the political 
order within a state and thereby alter the premises for all other questions.” (Wæver 2007: 
73). As Buzan shows, the literature largely treats security as “freedom from threat” both 
objectively and subjectively. “Threats seen as relevant are, for the most part, those that 
effect the self-determination and sovereignty of the unit” (Wæver 2007: 73).  
 
Furthermore, the author explains that trying to press the kind of unwanted 
fundamental political change on a ruling elite is similar to playing a game in which one's 
opponent can change the rules at any time he or she likes. “Power holders can always try 
to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, 
something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Wæver 2007: 73).  
Thus, Wæver claims, those who administer this order can easily use it for specific, self-
serving purposes which is something that cannot easily be avoided (Wæver 2007: 73).  
 
Finally, Wæver argues that: “Elites frequently present their interests in ‘national 
security’ dress, these claims are usually accompanied by a denial of elites' right to do so. 
Their actions are then labeled something else, for example, ‘class interests,’ which seems 
to imply that authentic security is, somehow, definable independent of elites, by direct 
reference to the ‘people’” (Wæver 2007: 75). However, the author asserts that security is 
articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice; by the elites (Wæver 2007: 
75).  
 
3.2 Analysis of Speech Acts  
 
In order to successfully apply the theory of securitization on the case of the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia I will try to analyze the elite relations in the country prior to the split. I 
will analyze the speech acts made by the key protagonists of the split as well as their mutual 
interaction.  
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Already in June 1990, mentions of state dissolution were existent in the 
Czechoslovak political arena. For example, in the following speech Mečiar mentions three 
orientations that would, according to him, decide the future of Czechoslovakia: “Today we 
can say that three orientations emerged during the electoral campaign. It is the unitary 
orientation, the officials who believe that federal government is the foundation of republic 
prosperity and see republic merely as regions, then there is the separatist orientation which 
claims we need to split from the Czechs and build independent Slovak state and there is 
the third orientation, which should be the most prominent one, the one presented by VPN 
that we are for the coexistence inside the common state of Czechs and Slovaks within the 
federation, but not one created by Husak’s communist party but federation where there will 
be guarantees of republic rights, where republics will have certain powers and state 
functions” (Historie.cs 2008, 06:00).  
Even though Mečiar labeled the federalist stance as the one that should be the most 
prominent, he introduced the idea of independent Slovakia in the Czechoslovak political 
discourse as well. This represented the beginning of political securitization of sovereignty 
by political elites. According to Buzan: “State security has sovereignty as its ultimate 
criterion, and societal security has identity. Both usages imply survival. A state that loses 
its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will 
no longer be able to live as itself. There are, then, at the collective level between individual 
and totality, two organizing centers for the concept of security: state and society” (Wæver 
2007: 83). 
Sovereignty is arguably one of the main concepts that led the whole Slovak 
nationalist narrative since the 1990 till the final dissolution of the state. “Svrchovanost” 
was at the core of Slovak demands for independence and a major factor that led to the 
breakup. The concept was manipulated by several figures in the Slovak political elite circle. 
First and foremost, by Vladimír Mečiar, who expressed the significance of sovereignty 
multiple times.  
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In the following statement on negotiations with the Czech side he claims: “We 
didn’t have much choice, when we discussed constitutional form of the state I went very 
far, and I was criticized by my fellow Slovaks for it, and I said all right let’s talk about the 
form of the federation, what is your idea, how should it look like, I agree…when they 
explained us their vision, one government, one state, one parliament, one economy, 
centralized state where there would be no talk about national issues, about no Slovak 
svrchovanost nor Slovak economy we found ourselves in a situation where we had no room 
for our interests” (Historie.cs 2007, 22:42). Here Mečiar puts sovereignty and economy at 
the heart of Slovak national interests. Not long after, Mečiar adds that Slovak side is willing 
to negotiate with Moravia separately and then the Czech Republic can join the negotiations. 
Furthermore, he affirms that the main issue and the only Slovak condition is subjectivity 
in the terms of International Law, while everything else is open to the negotiation with the 
Czech side (Ravik 2006: 213). Here it is important to note that Wæver argues that security 
problem is something that can undercut the political order within a state and thereby “alter 
the premises for all other questions.” In addition, as Buzan shows, the literature largely 
treats security as “freedom from threat”, both objectively and subjectively, and threats seen 
as relevant are, for the most part, those that effect the self-determination and sovereignty 
of the unit (Wæver 2007: 71). 
 
3.3 Evolution of Rhetoric 
 
In order to illustrate Mečiar’s and Klaus’s contribution to the final dissolution, I will 
try to present former Slovak and Czech PM’s speech acts and how they changed during the 
years. It is intriguing to follow Mečiar’s comments on Czech and Slovak relations since 
1990 and the enormous difference in rhetoric two years can make. Already in August 1990 
he dismisses the possibility of confederation and proclaimed that for the Czechoslovak 
system and the contemporary system of international relations it was unacceptable. He 
dismissed the idea of a state treaty as well and claimed that that sort of arrangement more 
suits a confederation (Ravik 2006: 213).  
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In October 1990, the Slovak prime minister again proclaimed his allegiance to the 
Czechoslovak state and claimed that he stood for the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks in 
one common state. Furthermore, in March 1991 he comments that even declaration of 
Slovak sovereignty wouldn't be the end of the Czechoslovak state. In April of the same 
year, Mečiar goes on to say that only Czechs can push the Slovaks towards the creation of 
independent Slovak state. Not exactly Czechs, meaning regular Czech citizens, he affirms, 
but only Czech politicians (Ravik 2006: 213). However, September of 1991 brings a 
significant shift in Mečiar’s rhetoric when he claims: “Recognition of our sovereignty and 
Slovak constitution are two fundamental steps that will take us toward confederation, 
meaning coexistence of two sovereign republics on the basis of a treaty” (Ravik 2006: 213). 
Here, Mečiar again sets the issue of sovereignty at the basis of Slovak aspirations and 
demands.  
Buzan gives more insight on what can be labeled as a securitizing move when he 
claims that there is a certain ambiguity in securitization theory: “The utterance of the word 
security is not the decisive criterion and securitization might consist of only a metaphorical 
security reference” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 27). Vocalizing the growing need 
and urgency for Slovak sovereignty and Slovak constitution by the leading Slovak 
politician can, therefore, be interpreted as a securitizing move.  
Moreover, examining the evolution of Václav Klaus’ rhetoric gives us more insight 
on the issue. Contrary to what one would think about Klaus, in 1991 his pro-federalist 
comment was noted in Reflex magazine where he claimed that he did not take the 
dissolution of the federation into account and that he planned to do everything in his power 
to prevent it. Klaus even labeled the assumptions as “catastrophic movie scenarios” which 
he was not planning to entertain (Ravik 2006: 205).  
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 It was a very different comment from the one he gave in “Mlada Fronta” 
newspapers: “There is a chance that federation will survive, but I have to admit there is 
very little chance that will happen. The negotiation and the result of meetings with HZDS 
nor the potential referendum results in each republic don’t matter that much. In my opinion, 
the process of state dissolution is already two years under way. Recently, the process only 
accelerated. The economies of both republics are moving apart unstoppably. I cannot 
conceive the political will that could roll it back. It is like pushing a cart down a steep hill 
– after a while, you struggle to hold on and you don't even think about driving or stopping” 
(Ravik 2006: 207). Here, leading Czech politician suggests that the federation is unlikely 
to “survive” while dismissing the idea of citizen participation on the issue.  
The interesting fact is that Klaus was aware of the nation’s sentiment as far as 
dissolution was concerned and was very well informed on the issue. Klaus also claimed 
that public surveys don’t indicate people’s support for the state dissolution (Ravik 2006: 
207). In addition, on the issue of citizen participation, Mr. Klaus adds that neither ODS nor 
he refuses the referendum but that they would go through with it only if they would be able 
to keep the status quo, which means that some sort of federation had to exist (Ravik 2006: 
208). There wasn’t a lack of fighting words as far as Klaus was concerned and despite 
being aware of nation’s disapproval of the ongoing politics he proclaimed that for almost 
three years, Czech side faced continuous Slovak pressure with the goal of state dissolution. 
It’s actual dissolution, Klaus said he would regret, but again, that he would not allow the 
existence of a caricature in the form of duplex or Czechoslovak Union, that was being 
forced on him by the Parliament. In his opinion, that kind of state structure would not be 
in the interest of the citizens of Czech Republic. Klaus along with the rest of Czech political 
elite had no intention of creating it (Ravik 2006: 208). Klaus’s apparent disregard for 
referendum was strongly shared by one of his closest associates and another prominent 
member of Czech political elite, the Czech Deputy Prime Minister Miroslav Macek.  
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I will cite an interesting comment Macek provided in “Občansky denik” newspapers 
on 17 July 1991, one year before the 1992 elections. “Among the ODS members, there is 
a prevailing opinion that Czechoslovakia will consist of only Bohemia, Morava and Silesia. 
Politicians from Slovakia are aware that most of the population is for the preservation of 
the common state. All right, but if we decide to do that we will find ourselves in the same 
position we are right now” (Ravik 2006: 201). Furthermore, Macek argues: “I find that 
calling for a referendum is absurd because both Czechs and Slovaks elected the members 
of Federal Parliament. They provided them with a mandate, which means that the above-
mentioned process should occur in premises of the Federal Parliament. To bypass the 
institution of Federal Parliament is absurd” (Ravik 2006: 201).  
What one can take from the words of former Deputy Prime Minister is that already 
in 1991, ODS leadership was keen on the idea of state dissolution and certain that the 
common state would be hard to sustain. As a matter of fact, after the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia was finished the same politician made the following comment: “I feel fine, 
for it is known that I was striving for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. I have a feeling of 
profound satisfaction” (Ravik 2006: 201).  
One year later, Milan Uhde, another man close to Klaus and member of parliament 
from 1990 to 1992, commented the outcome of 1992 elections as well as the possibility of 
potential referendum in the following words: „Slovak elections turned out the way they did 
unequivocally and now we hear again that there is a need to ask the people, a need to turn 
to the citizen, because obviously, political representations don't represent the citizen. [...] I 
repeat: The Slovak voter has clearly voted for the international sovereignty of Slovakia. 
Everything that follows has to derive from this politically motivated aspiration. Therefore, 
one needs to hold on to reality and not dream about some citizen with the big C, who will 
change the whole outcome of the elections by voicing his opinion in a referendum” (Ravik 
2006: 227). 
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On the topic of securitizing actors, Wæver notes that one cannot predict who will 
voice “societal security” concerns; but one can only see, with hindsight, how much 
legitimacy an actor possessed when she or he tried to speak on behalf of society. When 
applied to the case of Czechoslovakia, both Mečiar and Klaus, judging on the results of the 
1992 elections, felt they had enough legitimacy to start the process of state dissolution. The 
author asserts that: “Various actors try this all the time, but the attempt becomes 
consequential on a different scale when society more or less actively backs up the groups 
speaking” (Wæver 2007: 86). 
 
Whether society backed up the Czech and Slovak elites is a complex issue, one that 
is still very much debated. Even though political leadership never dismissed referendum as 
a possibility, no referendum was ever held. Therefore, the possibility to consult the 
Czechoslovakian public on the federation’s constitutional future was deliberately 
disregarded. Despite the fact that over two and a half million of Czech and Slovak citizens 
signed a petition demanding a referendum to be held it never happened, not in the Czech 
Republic nor in Slovakia (Kraus–Stanger: 2000a: 436).  
 
However, this elite behavior was expectable, if one takes into consideration that 
various polls consistently indicated that while Czechs and Slovaks might have disagreed 
on the desired path of political and economic transformation, the majority of both Czechs 
and Slovaks favored preserving Czechoslovakia right through the June 1992 elections 
(Kraus–Stanger: 2000a: 436).  In a way, voters had a referendum of sorts by participating 
in those elections and, where the Czech lands threw their support behind Václav Klaus’s 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which had minimal support in Slovakia, and Slovak voters 
endorsed Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), a party that 
had no organizational structure whatsoever in Bohemia and Moravia (Kraus–Stanger: 
2000a: 437). In other words, Czechs and Slovaks voted for the political leaders who led 
the country towards the breakup. Yet one can argue that even though that might be true, 
will for state dissolution in public political opinion was never a majority position.  
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3.4 Mechanism of Negotiations 
 
Wæver contends that a new feature in 1989 was the loss of support within the elites, 
which some characterized as a sudden loss of self-confidence by the regimes themselves. 
In other words, to explain the change, the author argues that we must look within elites and 
the ways in which the question of legitimacy among elites are being translated into the 
capacity to act. An important part of an order-maintaining action occurs by sustaining a 
shared worldview within some minimum inner-circle (Wæver 2007: 78). 
 
As far as the Czech and Slovak shared worldview is concerned, I will cite the 
comment Václav Klaus made on the issue in 1992: “I don’t know why we should 
compromise with the Slovak side when they lack in elemental truthfulness and basic 
negotiation existing among normal people” (Ravik 2006: 202). It is obvious from this 
comment of Czech head of the government that relations between the two political elites 
were far from harmonious and that this kind of language was freely used to describe the 
other side.  Furthermore, Klaus argued: “When we sail the open sea, every sailor can learn 
to navigate the helm, but when the storm hits, only captain can be at the helm and there 
shouldn’t be any question about whether the gorge or the reef should be avoided by turning 
to the right or to the left” (Ravik 2006: 202). What Klaus supposedly wanted to convey 
with this sailing allegory was that Czech side needed a powerful and decisive leadership 
that would lead the state in the right direction without unwanted public interference.  
 
As for the Slovak perception, when describing the negotiation process with the 
Czech side Mečiar gave this illustrative depiction: “Do not open your dirty mouth about 
Slovak representation or we will pack and you can negotiate by yourselves! Or in another 
meeting Czech official tells me: Don't be silly, we will not provide you with coal. And I 
said: Gas could not be provided as well! Him: We will make electricity more expensive! 
Me: Then perhaps oil won’t come as well! And that is how we negotiated in a friendly 
manner” (Ravik 2006: 212).  
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During another interview, given in July 1991 Mečiar proclaims: “The position, that 
Czech officials put themselves in is very disadvantageous for them. It is a position in which 
only extreme measures can be used and one that gives no space for maneuver” (Ravik 
2006: 212). The mention of extreme measures as the only alternative in the negotiations 
represents the securitizing language which arguably influenced the outcome of the whole 
negotiation process. Soon enough things took turn for the worse, rhetoric got even more 
conflict-oriented and it was hard to assess which side seemed to be pushing the state 
towards the brink harder. Slovaks proclaimed “svrchovanost” and it seemed that the 
country was on the verge of breakup. Therefore, declaration of Slovak sovereignty gave 
new momentum to ongoing rhetorical conflict. 
 Here it is important to take note of Ivan Gašparovič’s proclamation on the day of 
the declaration of svrchovanost: “We, democratically elected Slovak National Council 
solemnly declare that a thousand-year effort of Slovak nation for independence is 
completed. In this historical moment, we declare the natural right of Slovaks to self-
determination in the way it is embodied in all international treaties which speak about the 
right of nations to self-determination” (ČT 2012, 7:30). By referring to a thousand-year 
effort of Slovaks for reaching independence and self-determination Gašparovič effectively 
put concepts of sovereignty and self-determination of Slovak people above all other 
political or social ambitions in an effort to mobilize citizens around these concepts instead 
of those that would inspire Czechoslovak cohesiveness. When discussing culture, Ole 
Wæver, suggests that, if one’s identity seems threatened by, for example, 
internationalization or in this case federalization, the answer is a strengthening of existing 
identities. “In this sense, consequently, identity can become a security policy” (Wæver 
2007: 84). Therefore: “It is possible that national identities might be exploited and revived 
in terms of non-state, cultural self-defense” (Wæver 2007: 85). 
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Furthermore, in an interview which took place right after the voting process, one of 
declaration’s biggest proponents, Vladimír Mečiar gave his comments on the future of the 
common state. When asked, whether endorsement of the declaration meant the end of 
Czech and Slovaks coexistence, Mečiar responded: “We can have a common existence - 
one state, or coexistence and cooperation, so we will look for the answer whether it will be 
one state or two states which act internationally as two subjects, and we will look for the 
answer on the inside. New quality of cooperation and new degree of cooperation can be 
achieved but that is cooperation based on an agreement between two states, defined 
common apparatus and newly defined common interests. And if there is a problem today, 
then, it is the issue of defining common interest” (ČT 2012, 48:00). Here Mečiar stresses 
the problem of “common interest” between the two republics as a crucial issue in the 
relationship of both political elites.  
 In addition, when asked if he can confirm that with the declaration approval another 
step was made toward proclaiming Slovak independence, Mečiar replied: “Today gives a 
new dynamic to two subjects who need to redefine their relationship, that is a two-party 
affair, not only Slovak and it does not represent a response to nationalism, it is about 
creating new realities […] however the atmosphere in Slovakia is not anti-Czech nor anti-
Hungarian and we do not see Czech politics as anti-Slovak, this is about seeking self-
determination in new terms. We do not want to build borders” (ČT 2012, 49:00). 
 
Mečiar’s talk about creating new realities and building borders, even though he 
claimed he had no intentions of doing it, added more securitizing language to the discourse. 
However, Mečiar was not alone in this endeavor as Václav Klaus reacted followingly to 
the proclamation of Slovak svrchovanost: “I have to say, the fact that in this declaration 
they speak about Europe and the world but not Czechoslovakia, not even a word containing 
‘Czech’ is mentioned here, I find extremely significant and I find it immensely surprising. 
I am using these two neutral adjectives only because I wouldn’t want to use a stronger 
word” (ČT 2012, 17:00).  
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In addition, Mečiar claimed: “In Slovakia, we debated whether to proclaim 
svrchovanost, accept the constitution or not and then since December 1990 under the 
command of Petr Pithart, Czech government systematically and in an organized manner 
prepared state dissolution. I saw and read all these programs containing economic 
consequences and everything else. Therefore, despite the fact that today we are represented 
as those responsible for this situation, I don't perceive that as guilt but as a solution to a 
real situation which gives us an opportunity to decide for ourselves by ourselves” 
(Historie.cs 2007, 23:24). Here it is important to note that when discussing the elite 
behavior Weaver claims that: “Historically the decisive question, in regards to the 
securitizing move, was not the truth of the act but rather, the truth was given by the act 
being said from a specific position, thereby regenerating a loyal elite following, 
(re)installing the truth, and reimposing the center's will on the majority” (Wæver 2007: 78).  
 
This pronounced dichotomy of “us” as Slovaks and “them” as Czechs is crucial to 
the securitizing debate. Here Mečiar’s words regarding the opportunity for Slovak people 
to decide “for ourselves by ourselves” can be interpreted as a securitization of identity 
questions by political elites. For example, Wæver argues that the key to society is the set 
of ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. “Society is 
ultimately about identity, about the self-conception of communities and of individuals 
identifying themselves as members of a community” (Wæver 2007: 83). A society's 
survival is, therefore, a matter of identity according to the author (Wæver 2007: 83). Buzan 
notes that in the societal sector, as Copenhagen school defined it: “The referent object is 
large scale collective identities which can function independently of the state” (Buzan – 
Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 23). In this regard, Buzan gives examples of nations or religions. 
The author further argues that given the distinct nature of this referent object, it is very 
challenging to differentiate existential from lesser threats. In addition: “Collective 
identities naturally evolve and change in reaction to internal and external developments 
and these changes can be perceived either as invasive or heretical or they can be regarded 
as part of the evolution of identity” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 23). 
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Therefore, given the conservative nature of identity, it is always possible to perceive 
challenges and changes as threats to identity (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 23). The 
author claims this is due to the fact that: “We will no longer be us, no longer the way we 
were, or the way we really ought to be to be true to our identity” (Buzan – Wæver – de 
Wilde 1998: 23). Thus: “The question regarding the issue whether rival identities are 
securitized depends on whether the so-called ‘holders of collective identity’ take a 
relatively close minded or open minded view about how their identity is constituted and 
maintained” (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde  1998: 23). Therefore, I argue that by securitizing 
the identity questions by the Slovak elite, some Slovaks may have perceived the 
Czechoslovak federation as a threat to Slovak identity and in response voted for the 
nationalist parties and aspired for a sovereign, independent state which finally contributed 
to the state dissolution.  
 
Furthermore, there is some rhetorical evidence to suggest that elites engaged in 
securitization of economic issues as well. Economy, as mentioned, was a major issue 
between the two political elites and it showed growing tensions and disparities between the 
two sides. Regarding the dissatisfaction of some parts of the Czechoslovakian political 
arena with economic reform, Miroslav Macek, during an interview in the political 
magazine Respect, warned: “The left is preparing a general attack against the government 
and economic reform in autumn or winter” (Ravik 2006: 251). During the same interview, 
Klaus added: “Its triggering has a clearly stated goal – attempt to block the privatization 
and complicate everything” (Ravik 2006: 251).  
 
In addition, Macek elaborated on the Czech-Slovak divide while having a guest 
appearance on Czech television in leading political television show “Co týden dál” by 
saying that all he ever did was simplify what the Slovak side wanted from the beginning 
but never expressed it that way. Furthermore, Macek described Slovakia’s aspirations for 
a looser economic-defense union as “independence with Czech insurance” (Ravik 2006: 
202).  
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Such appearances in political debates on public television proved to be a very 
convenient platform for nationalist rhetoric. Thus, if the crucial and sole value, which the 
Copenhagen school conceives as vulnerable in the event of economic threats is the societal 
identity then securitization of economic issues had a direct impact on Czechoslovak 
identity (McSweeney 2004: 72). Furthermore, if one accepts the definition of society in 
terms of “individuals identifying themselves as members of a community”, the 
identification of Czech and Slovak citizens with Czechoslovak identity most likely suffered 
a significant blow. What this means is that rhetoric which involved highlighting differences 
between the two economies and claims such as Macek’s that Czechs would be paying for 
Slovak independence, did little to alleviate the tensions. On the contrary it contributed to 
the strengthening of “us” and “them” dichotomy as well as individual nationalist 
aspirations.  
Moreover, the amount of distrust that existed between Slovak and Czech political 
elites illustrates the following remark made by Václav Klaus published in Mladá Fronta 
newspapers in October 1992. “It is starting to show, it is as some little details suddenly 
become increasingly important. It concerns, for example, the issue with customs, where 
instead of ‘all customs duties will be abolished’ formulation, the Slovak side provides a 
new formulation ‘customs duties will be abolished’. For us, this means a very fiddly and 
delicate job to interpret what does leaving out one sole word in the Slovak proposal actually 
mean” (Ravik 2006: 262). And furthermore, Klaus claims: “Again, from the perspective of 
a common citizen some additional trifles occur. Nevertheless, these trifles can cause 
problems for the experts. For example, to compensate actives and passives in one banking 
system is not a problem. However, to find some key regarding how to achieve this after the 
split of the banking system in two will be complicated” (Ravik 2006: 262). Here Klaus 
warns about the complications that will occur after the practical implementation of the 
framework agreements between both sides. This kind of rhetoric shows that going into 
October 1992 Czech and Slovak elites were at a point where further negotiations that would 
lead to the continuance of common state weren’t realistic or perhaps not even welcomed. 
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In those last moments of negotiation Mečiar proclaimed that: “Almost till quarter to 
4 in the morning I was trying to convince Czech partners not to leave and not to declare 
independence” (Ravik 2006: 264). On the other side Klaus claimed: “On the contrary it is 
the Slovak side which found itself in a very complicated situation when it started several 
games and now will have a lot of problems to hold those games under control” (Ravik 
2006: 264). In the midst of this rhetorical blame game played by the chosen few a state fell 
apart and changed lives of millions.  
In addition, Federal Prime Minister J. Strasky gave some valuable insight regarding 
the role of his cabinet in the final dissolution of the common state: “This government was 
formed only so it could prepare the state for breakup in legal and organizational terms. It 
cannot solve any problem where Czech and Slovak interests collide precisely because it 
was formed so it wouldn’t be able to” (Ravik 2006: 263).  
Here I would like to add former Slovak prime minister’s recent interview published 
by idnes.cz which gives more insight on the mechanics of state dissolution and the power 
distribution among the elites. In a revealing interview, Mečiar claims: “I made 90 percent 
of Slovak delegation, Václav Klaus 80 percent of Czech delegation, the rest were various 
advisors” (IDNES 2016). Furthermore, Mečiar explains why elites orchestrated the split 
and why citizens were left out: “Václav Klaus told me at the time, that he can split the 
federation, that he has all legal rights to do so and doesn’t need to ask anyone. He also said 
that if there would be a problem with the split in Slovakia, we could organize a referendum. 
The only problem was the law as it said that if Czechoslovakia is to be broken apart then 
the republic which generated the split would have to forfeit all property in favor of the 
other. Therefore, in the case of a one-sided referendum, there was a possibility that in 
Slovakia, all property would be forfeited in favor of Czech Republic” (IDNES 2016). In 
addition, he argues: “Slovaks had to gain independence, there was no other way. We had 
to experience, how is it to fight and live alone. Today the relations between both countries 
are very advanced, we can set an example for the European Union” (IDNES 2016).  
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If we go back to the securitization definition: “Securitization refers more precisely 
to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential 
threat: “The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: 
When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve 
sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have 
to be obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential 
threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she 
would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization” (Buzan – Wæver 
– de Wilde 1998: 25). Furthermore, the author asserts that constituting something as a 
security problem grants privilege to official leaders and legitimizes the suspension of civil 
and liberal rights (Buzan – Wæver – de Wilde 1998: 27).  
Thus, I argue that Czech and Slovak political elites securitized the questions of 
sovereignty and identity and moved the issues outside of norms of regular politics, 
overstepping their boundaries and dissolving the state without giving the possibility of 
choice to their citizens who in return tolerated this violation – successfully finalizing the 
process of securitization.  
What followed was the process of “desecuritization”, defined by Waever as: “The 
progressive removal of issues from the security agenda as they are dealt with via 
institutions and practices that do not implicate force, violence, or the security dilemma” 
(Waever 2007: 159). Desecuritization process started right after the results of 1992 
elections. Regarding the future of the common state Klaus proclaimed: “Everything stands 
and falls with the possibility of elementary compromise with HZDS” (Historie.cs 2008, 
41:47).  On the Slovak side Mečiar noted: “We think that ODS along with Mr. Václav 
Klaus prepared very well for the meeting because for over a year they never attacked us, 
even though, by doing that, they could have gained easy points in Czech political arena” 
(Historie.cs 2008, 42:24).  
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Furthermore, regarding the future of Czechoslovak federation Mečiar proclaimed: 
“We assume that on 1 January 1993 the Czech and Slovak republic will come into existence 
as two separate state entities. Unfortunately, although many people are emotionally 
connected to the current constitutional form, there is a need to realistically and responsibly 
say that the current situation is unattainable. The situation is in the state of inertia in such 
a way that it could spin out of control, and staying and defending the current situation is 
worse than stand up to the new truth, accept it and deal with it” (ČT 2012a, 11:57). Klaus 
provided some reassuring words as well: “From the Czech Republic perspective I believe 
that, if that process occurs, as it was planned, regulated, prepared, in a controlled, peaceful 
form, I believe, ODS believes, that we can build better relations with Slovakia, long-term, 
more lasting relations than the ones we have now” (ČT 2012a, 12:29).  
This sudden change in rhetoric, the unexpected amity between the leaders of both 
republics had the purpose of deescalating the tension that was building up and preparing a 
peaceful “divorce”. Securitizing language was suddenly gone and all that was left was a 
divided country.   
 
3.5 Václav Havel and his Role in the Breakup 
 
So far, I have argued that the main protagonists of the Czechoslovak dissolution 
were Czech and Slovak prime ministers Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar. However, 
even though Klaus and Mečiar have been the most active and obvious factors behind the 
split, there is something left to be said about the former Czechoslovak president, Václav 
Havel’s involvement. Ravik’s already mentioned metaphor of Czechoslovak “Bermuda 
triangle” included both Czech and Slovak prime ministers along with Václav Havel. 
Therefore, it would be prudent to analyze his speech acts and look for the securitizing 
language within.  
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The following citation is Havel’s address to the nation in November 1991 where he 
warns about the ongoing tensions and constitutional deadlock between the two sides: “Dear 
fellow citizens. All indications are that at the moment it is beyond the power of our 
representatives to timely and reasonably arrange the future of our national coexistence. 
They are politically split, paralyzed by internal divisions and ever more dangerously 
distancing themselves from the citizens who elected them. The citizens of our two republics 
want to finally know in what kind of state they will live, and by present-day’s state of 
constitutional negotiations, they are disappointed and rightly feel threatened by their 
potential failure. The legitimacy of these concerns, aggravated by the fact that the current 
constitutional situation inherited from Communism, offers no constitutional ways to deal 
with such crises and to counter the risk that the deepening contradictions will eventually 
completely paralyze the functioning of state power” (Vaclavhavel.cz 2017). 
 
 He goes on to say: “I urge you to in order to save our country from the chaos, in 
the interest of democracy and all the ideals on behalf of you rebelled two years ago against 
the totalitarian regime, far louder than before, express your desire to live in a reasonable 
and fairly organized, prosperous country and help our quarreling parliaments to find a way 
out of the impasse into which they found themselves in […] I once said to one of the great 
manifestation of that truth and love must prevail over lies and hatred. Today I would like 
to add to that sense, humility and responsibility must prevail over short-sightedness, pride, 
and self-will. In a sense, today the stakes are much higher than two years ago. Then it was 
just a question of whether we will have to endure decaying totalitarian system for a while 
longer, or whether we will tell him the clear ‘no’. Today, it is about whether we will become 
a civilized European democracy or a scorned place full of constant conflicts and 
confusions” (Vaclavhavel.cz 2017). 
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Clearly in a situation where Havel did not know how to relieve the ongoing tension, 
he urges the citizen to take action. A valuable cause indeed, however by using terms such 
as threat from failure, saving the country from chaos and by issuing warning about 
Czechoslovakia becoming a scorned place full of constant conflicts, former Czechoslovak 
president practically helped the ongoing process of securitization. Furthermore, in a speech 
he made only couple of days later, Havel claims: “I do not want to go to war against 
parliaments and I don’t want to pull you into such a war. Parliaments are fundamental and 
most important institutions of our newly developed democracy. I ask only of our 
parliaments - and especially of those MPs who are inclined to complicate, by their own 
actions the work of others - to quickly agree on the future of our state and respectively, 
create necessary conditions for such an agreement. These parliaments have adopted dozens 
of important laws. To make this work meaningful it is necessary to know to what kind of 
state will the enacted laws apply” (Vaclavhavel.cz 2017a). In this passage, there is again a 
pronounced sense of urgency in Havel’s words, he even uses the term “war” to express the 
gravity of the situation. Thus, by trying to mobilize society so it could confront internal 
threat of dissolution, Havel likely, even if unknowingly, contributed to the securitization 
process and the final dissolution of the state. 
Moreover, Havel might have played another significant role in the final dissolution 
of the state. In order to understand the connection, one needs to go back to 1991. As 
mentioned, relations between main protagonists of Czech and Slovak political elites were 
not too friendly at the time. As a matter of fact, Ravik notes that Mečiar blamed Czech 
political elite and especially Václav Havel for his removal from Slovak premiership in 
1991. Petr Pithart gives his take on removal and resurgence of Vladimír Mečiar in the 
Czechoslovak political arena by saying that elimination of Mečiar took six weeks, which 
he found considerably awkward, violent and he believed that Mečiar “suffered like an 
animal”. However, in his opinion, this unfortunate turn of events must have motivated 
Mečiar to try to reach premiership again, but in a completely different way, and with many 
supporters (Ravik 2006: 204). 
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 Furthermore, Pithart claims that Mečiar knew he could bring the new supporters 
only under a new national flag and that for him to come back, the common state had to fall 
apart. On the other side, Klaus responded in a manner which showed that he wasn’t exactly 
against the idea (Ravik 2006: 204). Here, Václav Havel’s speech prior to the 1992 elections 
proves to be a very interesting moment, one that didn’t help state dissolution “per se” but 
overall did little to alleviate the existing tension. “I beg you not to support the ones who 
say they will solve everything for you. That sort of people want you to be silent, to listen 
and keep up. I beg you, not to support those who have dictatorial inclinations, change their 
opinion too often, who are not able to negotiate with others, who propose all kinds of 
adventurous, ill-conceived and irresponsible solutions and those who would prefer to go 
back to centralistic governance of all our common affairs” (Ravik 2006: 210). President’s 
address was obviously directed predominantly towards the Slovak voters warning them 
about the consequences of electing Vladimír Mečiar as their head of government. 
Nevertheless, Havel’s words failed to impact the results of elections as well as deescalating 
tensions among the political elites. On the contrary, Havel possibly made the Czech-Slovak 
relations even more tense.  
In another interview published almost one year before the 1992 elections, Mečiar 
claims: “According to the information I was provided, Mr. President called Mr. Klaus and 
asked him: Well, you are going to win in the Czech Republic and ‘Mečar’ in Slovakia (he 
could have learned by then what my name was) so, will there be a federation, are you able 
to communicate to one another? Why wouldn’t we be able to communicate? What I mean 
is, Czechs will be the ones who hinder all policies, who break this state apart” (Ravik 2006: 
214). Apparently, Mečiar was very aware of Havel’s opinion of him and, unfortunately for 
the future of the common state Havel did little to alleviate the tension. What is perhaps 
surprising is that initially the tension was predominantly felt between Havel and Mečiar. 
For Klaus, on the other hand, Mečiar had some friendlier words mentioning that he thought 
of Klaus as being: “The only Czech politician, who never criticized the Slovak officials, 
never offended them and always when negotiations would take turn for the worse Klaus 
would be the only one silent” (Ravik 2006: 214).  
51 
 
As mentioned, the same day when Slovaks declared “svrchovanost”, Václav Havel 
abdicated as Czechoslovak president and proclaimed that he cannot be responsible for 
actions he no longer influenced. Havel further claimed that divisive Slovak politics 
prevailed and as for the Czech side and ODS, Havel affirmed he agreed with Klaus and 
supported the ODS platform. Former Czechoslovak president also added that organizing a 
referendum was no longer possible (Ravik 2006: 262).  
Arguably, by standing with Klaus and abdicating the seat of president Havel 
remained a passive spectator of the Czech and Slovak breakup. Nevertheless, his comments 
may have helped legitimize Klaus’ agenda and contributed to the fact that the common 
state was being dissolved by its political elites, primarily by leadership of its two most 
powerful political parties and by the two political figures who were given the privilege to 
represent the country they both helped fall apart. His poor relationship with leading Slovak 
politician and the securitizing language within his speeches might have been a contributing 
factor as well.  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In my Thesis, I tried to find the reasons behind the peaceful dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, and my aim was to explain the events leading to the split as well as 
revealing the factors that caused it. In the theoretical part of my Thesis, I tried to find the 
breaking points that eventually led to the split. I further tried to single out the most 
important actors which contributed to the dissolution and aimed to find the reasons behind 
their action. My main goal was to answer the question: “What are the key factors 
underlying the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia?” 
In the first part of my Thesis I addressed the role of political elites and institutional 
challenges that were dominating the Czechoslovak political arena. I argued that after the 
fall of communism in Czechoslovakia began the process of establishing new political 
actors.  
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I noted that Czechoslovakia, since its inception, never had a single multinational 
leadership nor autonomous ethnically divided elites instead the configuration included 
tripartite elite groups which always included Czech and Slovak element. However, even 
though Slovaks had legitimate participation and enduring voice in the governance, many 
of them felt that the official leadership failed to represent their interests. Furthermore, post-
communist democratization led to the breakdown of the triadic pattern. This meant an 
institutional crisis which would present a significant barrier in the Czechoslovak relations. 
The democratization of both political systems proved to be an opportunity for a split along 
republican lines and emergence of two separate party subsystems. Furthermore, the 
emerging institutional system caused competition among the elites and provided a 
substantial motivation for avoiding the compromise and competing for the biggest share of 
the electorate.  
Thus, the two opposing groups of elites tried to capitalize on ethnic belonging and 
the ethnicity card proved to be a very effective weapon in their hands. This trend was more 
evident in Slovakia where ethnicity and the Czech-Slovak relations became an occurring 
theme of the political agenda. In return, this nationalist shift became more and more 
prominent creating more room for conflict among the elites. One of the most significant 
actors in this aspect was the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia led by Vladimír Mečiar, 
which was the main platform for expressing Slovak national grievances. 
In the following chapter I dissect the issue of Slovak nationalism and I look for its 
source in recent Slovak history. One of those sources was arguably the Slovak wartime 
state, which provided a constitutional basis of the independent Slovakia and presented the 
backbone of some nationalist claims for independence in the post-communist years. The 
establishment of the Slovak state also showed that Slovaks were capable of running their 
own country without the Czechs, in this regard its heritage is indeed relevant. However, I 
claim that the rise of Slovak nationalism wasn’t the only factor that led to the breakup of 
Czechoslovakia.  
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In the next chapter I argue that 1992 elections and declaration of Slovak 
svrchovanost were likely the breaking points that led to the final dissolution. The major 
election win of ODS and HZDS represented a defeat of common state aspirations. The 
coalition between ODS led by Václav Klaus and Christian Democratic Party (KDS) won 
in the Czech Republic with a clear agenda of accomplishing economic reform and finding 
the way to an effective federation or dissolution. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar’s HZDS 
won on the basis of populist sometimes even contradictory statements about the future of 
the common state. Mečiar walked the line between sovereignty and federation while trying 
to present both options as if they were not mutually exclusive. These events were followed 
by declaration of Slovak sovereignty in July 1992 which left little room for maneuver as 
far as sustaining the common state is concerned.  
 
Another important aspect of the Czechoslovak split was the assumed difference 
regarding economic growth and strength of both states. Jan Svejnar considers this 
economic heterogeneity of Czech and Slovak republics, only a perceived difference which, 
nevertheless, significantly contributed to the dissolution. However, the author claims that 
with the exception of unemployment, the economic performance of the Czech and Slovak 
republics has been very similar. Thus, during the elite negotiations the considerable 
economic similarity of both economies was essentially ignored. The main points of debates 
were focused on differences rather than similarities. Focusing on aspects such as high 
unemployment rate in Slovakia and a bit weaker economic performance of the country, 
enabled the leaders to exploit these differences and present it as unsolvable barriers to the 
further existence of federation. Therefore, the breakup of the state was arguably a 
convenient solution for political elites of both republics as it permitted the Slovak 
leadership to proceed with more moderate and socially oriented policies, and at the same 
time allowed the Czech government to go through with rapid economic transformation. 
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In the practical part of my Thesis I aimed to successfully apply the theory of 
securitization on the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Thus, I tried to analyze the 
elite relations in the country prior to the split. My goal was to analyze the speech acts made 
by the key protagonists of the split as well as their mutual interaction.  
According to Buzan, state security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and 
societal security has identity thus two organizing centers for the concept of security are 
state and society. In this regard, I argue that sovereignty is arguably one of the main 
concepts that led the whole Slovak nationalist narrative since the 1990 till the final 
dissolution of the state. The concept of “svrchovanost” was at the core of Slovak demands 
for independence and it was manipulated by several figures in the Slovak political elite 
circle, mainly by Vladimír Mečiar. Furthermore, based on Buzan’s comment on the 
definition of securitizing move where the author notes that the utterance of the word 
security is not the decisive criterion and securitization might consist of only a metaphorical 
security reference, Mečiar’s vocalizing of the growing need and urgency for Slovak 
sovereignty and Slovak constitution can be interpreted as a securitizing move. On the 
Czech side, Klaus presented a significant actor as far securitizing language is concerned. 
His claims on bleak possibility of state survival and dismissal of the possible referendum 
on the state future have likely contributed to the securitization process. 
Furthermore, the pronounced dichotomy of “us” as Slovaks and “them” as Czechs 
is crucial to the securitizing debate. Here Mečiar’s words regarding the opportunity for 
Slovak people to decide “for ourselves by ourselves” can be interpreted as a securitization 
of identity questions by political elites. Therefore, I argue that by securitizing the identity 
questions by the Slovak elite, some Slovaks may have perceived the Czechoslovak 
federation as a threat to Slovak identity and in response voted for the nationalist parties and 
aspired for a sovereign, independent state which finally contributed to the state dissolution.  
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Moreover, I claim that there is some rhetorical evidence to suggest that elites 
engaged in securitization of economic issues as well. Economy, as mentioned, was a major 
issue between the two political elites and it showed growing tensions and disparities 
between the two sides. Here the biggest contribution regarding the securitizing language 
was made by ODS politician and close Klaus’ associate Miroslav Macek. His comments 
regarding the economic attacks by the left, as well as his famous phrase about Slovak 
independence with Czech insurance, likely contributed to the ongoing securitizing 
discourse and possibly made the Czech citizen more skeptical about the further existence 
of the common state. Thus, I argued that if the crucial and sole value, which the 
Copenhagen school conceives as vulnerable in the event of economic threats is the societal 
identity then securitization of economic issues had a direct impact on Czechoslovak 
identity.  
Therefore, rhetoric which involved highlighting differences between the two 
economies and claims such as Macek’s that Czechs would be paying for Slovak 
independence, did little to alleviate the tensions. On the contrary it most likely strengthened 
the “us” and “them” dichotomy as well as individual nationalist aspirations.  
The Securitization concept developed by the Copenhagen school postulates that 
securitization refers to the process of presenting an issue in security terms as an existential 
threat and that the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political 
constellations by analyzing when does an argument with particular rhetorical and semiotic 
structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that 
would otherwise have to be obeyed. Thus, I argue that the Czech and Slovak political elites 
securitized the questions of sovereignty and identity and moved the issues outside of norms 
of regular politics, overstepping their boundaries and dissolving the state without giving 
the possibility of choice to their citizens who in return tolerated this violation and 
successfully finalized the process of securitization.  
 
56 
 
In the last chapter I discuss the possibly overlooked role of Václav Havel in the final 
dissolution of the common state. Based on his speeches given at the time, I argue that in a 
situation where Havel did not know how to relieve the ongoing tension, he urged the citizen 
to take action. By using terms such as saving the country from chaos and by issuing a 
warning about Czechoslovakia becoming a scorned place full of constant conflicts, former 
Czechoslovak president practically helped the ongoing process of securitization. 
Moreover, I mention former president’s bad relationship with Mečiar which did little to 
help the negotiations with the Slovak prime minister.  
In conclusion, I argue that by standing with Klaus and abdicating the seat of 
president Havel remained a passive spectator of the Czech and Slovak breakup. However, 
his comments may have helped legitimize Klaus’ agenda and contributed to the fact that 
the common state was being dissolved by its political elites.  
Finally, the Czech-Slovak debate cannot be seen as a one-sided affair and a product 
of Slovak pursuit of national goals. Both sides of political elites had their contribution to 
the final dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the process of dissolution was accelerated when 
the rhetoric of both parties became more aggressive and conflict oriented. Arguably, 
radicalization of stance on the Slovak side in return led to radicalization of the stance on 
the Czech side. More boldly, this phenomenon of aggressive elite rhetoric in challenging 
political atmosphere might have been the crucial disintegrative factor for the existence of 
the common state. Nonetheless, the desecuritization process and dissolution of the state 
negotiated on the elite level and far from the public eye might have contributed to the 
peaceful character of the dissolution.  
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6 Резюме 
 
Цель данной работы состоит в выявлении причин,которые привели к мирному 
распаду Чехословакии и в изложении событий, привёдших к разделению, а также в 
выявлении факторов,которые данному разделению поспособствовали. В 
теоритической части моей дипломной работы я постарался обозначить те 
переломные моменты, которые привели к распаду Чехословакии. Также я упомянул 
о тех важных личностях, которые были причастны к распаду и обозначил мотивы их 
действий. Моей главной задачей был поиск ответа на следующий вопрос: “Каковы 
ключевые факторы, которые стали причиной мирного распада Чехословацкой 
федерации?“ В рамках теории эта работа затрагивает концепт секьюритизации 
копенгагенской школы. Теория секьюритизации, разработанная копенгагенской 
школой, говорит о том, что секьюритизация касается процесса постановки вопроса 
с точки зрения безопасности как экзистенциальной угрозы. Изучение 
секьюритизации заключается в исследовании дискурса и политических 
констелляций путём анализа, когда утверждение со специфической риторической и 
семиотической структурами достигает того эффекта, когда общество допускает 
нарушение правил, которые в противном случае бы были соблюдены. Применение 
этой теории в случае распада Чехословакии привело к заключению о том, что 
чешская и словацкая политическая элита секьюритизировала вопросы суверенитета 
и тождественности. Тем самым они вынесли эти вопросы за границы обычной 
политики и разделили государство без того, чтобы обычные граждане имели 
возможность выбора. Чехословацкие граждане допустили это нарушение правил и 
этим был успешно закончен процесс секьюритизации. И, наконец, процесс 
десекьюритизации с учётом того факта, что решение было принято элитой вне 
общественного мнения, по всей вероятности способствовал мирному распаду 
Чехословакии. 
 
